MysteriousFaith

March 2007 USCC Meeting

Washington – The second USCC meeting of 2007 began last Thursday with testimony from three members of Congress: Madeleine Bordallo (D-Guam), Tim Ryan (D-OH), and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). These meetings, typically leading indicators of Washington’s attitude towards many things China, this week ventured into an area of great sensitivity – China’s military modernization and its impact on the US and the Asia Pacific.

In his opening statement, Hearing Co-Chairman William Reinsch commented that: “The issues we will be exploring today are important – not because conflict with China is likely, but because the cost of miscalculation is unaffordably high. For this reason, it is important that we understand as best we can the intentions behind China’s military modernization and strategic planning.” Reinsch’s moderate tone was consistent with much of last week’s testimony, including that of Bordallo and Ryan.

As the Congresswoman for Guam, a territory of increasingly critical significance for the US military and its ability to project power in the Asia-Pacific region, Bordallo emphasized it is crucial that China’s military intentions be clear. “… the need for the government of the People’s Republic of China to work to increase the transparency of its foreign policy and military decision making processes, its current and planned military capabilities, and the true and accurate amount of its defense and national security budgets among others issues is important.”

Much more hawkish were the comments of Congressman Rohrabacher who shared with the commission his belief that “the Chinese government has embarked on a well orchestrated campaign to put China on the path to global domination.” Drawing this general observation down into sharper focus, the Congressman went further to state that “Under the leadership of the CCP, China’s billion people have been educated to hate America because they believe [we are] stopping them from achieving their rightful power and influence.” Congressman Rohrabacher then proceeded to touch on an issue which later testimony would intelligently expand upon, the question of China’s “perception management” of its economic development and military modernization, when he asked “Why is it that our nation keeps ignoring the hard cold fact that China’s dictators have some very real evil and devious goals?”

Among the more penetrating Congressional testimony was that from Tim Ryan, whose Ohio district acutely feels the pain of China’s economic mercantilism like few districts outside the manufacturing intensive Midwest can appreciate. As a consequence of Ryan’s experience, he has sponsored the Fair Currency Act of 2007 (also known as the Ryan-Hunter Bill), which promises to directly take on the currency portion of China’s mercantilist policies. As Ryan elaborated, “[the bill] defines ‘exchange-rate misalignment as a foreign government’s maintenance of an undervalued currency by means of protracted large-scale intervention in currency markets, regardless of the intent of the foreign government.”

For those peering into the short-term, the Ryan-Hunter bill suggests that the US Congress is beginning to weigh more serious action against China than it has in recent past. In concert with the Bush Administration’s USTR grievance against China at the WTO, the position on China - at least with respect to its currency policy - appears to be hardening in Washington. Whether this is a broader realignment towards a more hawkish sentiment against China remains to be seen; it is likely more aggressive movement on the currency issue by Beijing would go far in buying both China’s economic policies, and its halting efforts towards further political liberalization, additional time in DC.

For Ryan, the connection between China’s currency practices and its military modernization is obvious: “The new and advanced weapon systems being purchased by the Chinese military are being financed by the massive reserve in U.S. dollars owned by the Chinese government mainly as a result of their currency misalignment.” A rare bipartisan moment in Washington may be taking shape as congressmen from both sides of the aisle join together, one group representing conservatives who are hawkish towards China’s military build-up and another who represents organized labor. Intermixed through both are those advocating that the U.S. be more assertive in defending its manufacturing sector from unfair trade practices, China’s currency policy being only one part of this. The fact that China’s economic policy facilitates its growing emphasis on building a world-class military is not lost on many in Washington, and harsher economic policy may be viewed as one of the more effective means by which Beijing’s military spending can be curtailed.

China’s spending on conventional military assets presents its own challenge, but one that the U.S. military and intelligence community is reasonable adept at handling; however, more complex is China’s increasingly effective use of perception management as a tool for guiding U.S. media attention towards those stories Beijing wishes to see emphasized. Undoubtedly, all governments engage in perception management, but Beijing’s use of this tactic is unusually suspicious because its own internal media agency Xinhua meets no external standards for autonomy. Consequently, China’s attempt to use perception management on those outside its borders builds upon a foundation of deceit and propaganda from within. But even with this inefficiency built into the Chinese perception management capability, it has been surprisingly effective at positively impacting a number of defense-related stories, foremost among them the US Navy EP-3 and Chinese F-8 fighter mid-air encounter.

Dr. Derek Reverson, Associate Professor at the US Naval War College, testified that after this incident, his research suggests Xinhua was able to influence the New York Times in such a way as to bend the story away from the paper’s initial American sympathies towards a more China-friendly perspective. Reverson was quick to point out that the one-media outlet in China makes control of access and content a unique challenge for developing stories like the EP-3 collision. The greater danger, as Reverson argued, is that long-term, “… perception management results in the target misinterpreting data over time and being an unknowing participant in the process.”

According to testimony at last week’s USCC meeting, China’s current sophistication in its perception management parallels that of the latter stages of the Cold War, in particular the Soviet downing of KAL007. After this tragedy, the Soviets were surprisingly successful at getting certain portions of the international media to take its claims seriously that the flight was an illegal intelligence gathering mission designed to “tickle” border radar stations. Similarly, incidents which occur within China’s sovereign territory give it, coupled to its state-run media outlet, a unique ability to craft what information is disseminated, and thereby much of what constitutes world opinion on the event itself.

USCC Commissioner Larry Wortzel observed that he had personally felt the impact of Beijing’s perception management when his biography for a Carnegie Endowment debate held in Washington on China’s military modernization was asked to be modified so it would not read that he lived in Beijing during the Tiananmen Square Massacre, but instead during the Tiananmen student demonstration. According to Wortzel, Carnegie may have been attempting to soften the language it used on this very sensitive topic given its recent opening of a Beijing office. This request exemplifies the hidden hand of Beijing’s influence in determining what language may and may not be used to describe its history, intent and policies.

Reaching between capitals is never an easy task for any government, but China’s ability to successfully employ perception management no-doubt owes much to the economic interests in America who are eager to see China as a business partner, no matter what else might be at stake. Every country is eager to manage its international image, and savvy diplomats engaged with China would do well to remember that the amount of time, energy and money Beijing invests in perception management is an indication of how badly it wants to be taken seriously, a realization which illuminates much of the country’s motives for modernizing its military as well.

In later testimony, General James E. Cartwright, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, reiterated that the Chinese ASAT test should not have come as a surprise. He stated that the adjustments the Chinese military made over the course of their three ASAT tests were significant. Cartwright is hopeful that China will discover, as did the Soviet Union and the United States, that ASAT platforms are not a particularly useful weapons system and will abandon them. Cartwright shared the view that the Chinese did not appreciate the collateral damage – both in terms of space debris and international reaction – when it elected to conduct the test. He was quick to suggest that the U.S. not forget its own history when judging China; “… when talking about your adversary carry a mirror.”

Since the first Gulf War in 1990, the Chinese PLA has been quick to recognize the advantages which come to the U.S. because of its integrated joint operations. Referred to by the U.S. military as C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), developing this type of capability would be a fundamental improvement in the PLA’s capabilities. Cortez Cooper, Director of the East Asia Studies Center for Hicks and Associates, Inc., expanded on this: “These systems and programs potentially allow the PLA to conduct the operations that underpin the PLA’s joint offensive campaigns – to include over-the-horizon precision strikes against land and maritime targets; kinetic and non-kinetic counter-C4ISR attacks; air superiority operations; and airborne and airmobile operations.” Fixating on individual weapons platforms that China has acquired or is domestically building is certainly one important track for ascertaining Beijing’s capabilities, but the question of whether they can integrate all these new assets into a coordinated battle-field strategy remains to be seen, and will only be possible through C4ISR capabilities. Especially problematic to slowing China’s ability to introduce C4ISR “Informationized Warfare” is that much of the infrastructure which enables this is dual-use, making it very difficult to prevent Beijing from developing this capability.

While the specter of a truly coordinated Chinese military troubles many, the role of the country’s growing submarine force was a topic of much discussion at the USCC hearing, in large part because of the role submarines would play in a potential Taiwan conflict. This realization was stated best by Eric A. McVadon, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired) in his testimony: “The effort to complicate U.S. Navy intervention would, it appears, be spearheaded by eight new Kilo-class submarines from Russia that would pose a dilemma for U.S. decision makers. Would it be prudent to sail several U.S. Navy Carrier strike groups (CSGs) into waters with many undetected PLAN (PLA Navy) submarines capable of submerged launch of very potent anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) – notably the Kilos with the S-N-27B Sizzler with ranges over 100 miles?”

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson, Assistant Professor China Maritime Studies Institute of the Naval War College, expanded on the role China’s submarines could play in possible Taiwan contingencies; however, Erickson was quick to remind the commission that for the foreseeable future, China’s capabilities center on access denial of “… the littorals around China, with an intense focus on the waters and air around Taiwan.” The Kilo class submarines present a significant threat to U.S. carrier battle groups, in part because of the effectiveness of their anti-ship cruise missiles. Concerning this Erickson said, “It is important to recall that a single, Chinese-made C-802 ASCM, which is less capable than China’s newer ASCMs, disabled Israel’s Hanit Sa’ar 5-class missile boat in 2006 and killed four sailors.”

China’s poorest kept state-secret, its infant aircraft carrier program, was briefly discussed. Because the U.S. derives enormous power projection capabilities from its own carrier battle fleet, a country developing its own aircraft carrier bears the gravitas of such a country developing its own nuclear weapon, albeit with the carrier fitting into a more conventional classification. Whether China will have such a capability in the next 10-15 years was deemed likely by most of the panelists, but the logistical problems in fielding a carrier were believed to prevent any such capability from being a meaningful force projection for China in the mid-term.

The most recent USCC meeting suggested China’s Kilo class submarines, their anti-ship cruise missiles, and an increased emphasis on integrated warfare are all beginning to weigh more heavily on the minds of U.S. military planners. However, it is equally important to remember the role interpretation of the evidence plays, a lesson U.S. policy makers should well remember from the interpretive errors which led up to the recent war in Iraq. China’s motives are typically believed to fit within one of the following three propositions: the country wants to modernize because it equates a modern military with a certain prestige and status in the eyes of the world; it must modernize because it views the possibility of a confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan as inevitable; or, it is modernizing as part of a concerted attempt on its part to become a regional power, and then a true international hegemon, rivaling the U.S.

Throughout last week’s meeting, the issues of transparency and intent on the part of China were returned to over and over. Whatever combination of the three previously mentioned propositions may be driving China’s military modernization forward remains to be seen, and may likely change from leader to leader, but what is unlikely to change is a spirit of distrust unless both China and the U.S. can establish a framework within which to work and judge each other’s intent without revealing capabilities. What this will require in terms of policy remains to be seen, but with the known risk-factor of Taiwan in the mix, it behooves both countries to energize those systems and lines of communication which will provide the most likely means of defusing possible confrontations and misunderstanding.

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• April 1, 2007

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